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Genealogy or Asabiyya? Ibn Khaldun 
between Arab Nationalism and the 
Ottoman Caliphate
nurullah arDIç, Istanbul Şehir University
Introduction1
Ibn Khaldun’s concept of asabiyya, as well as his view 
of the rise and fall of civilizations as outlined in his 
theory of ʿumran, are known to have influenced gen-
erations of scholars since the late 16th century. To a 
certain extent, the Ottoman elites of the 16th–19th 
centuries also adopted the Khaldunian view of history 
and politics, and there has been some modern research 
done on Ibn Khaldun’s impact on these Ottoman in-
tellectuals as well.2 However, the role played by this 
important Muslim thinker in the political struggles 
of the Ottoman milieu has not been paid enough 
attention.
This article examines Ibn Khaldun’s ‘contribution’ 
to the political debates on the Ottoman Caliphate dur-
ing the first quarter of the twentieth century, particu-
1 Several of the primary sources analyzed in this article have 
been collected in İ. Kara, Hilafet Risaleleri, 5 vols. (Istanbul, 2002–
2005). Hereafter this collection will be referred to as HR.
2 Z. F. Fındıkoğlu, “Türkiye’de İbn Haldunizm,” in Fuad 
Köprülü Armağanı, ed. O. Turan, H. Eren, and E. Bilgic (İstanbul, 
1953); C. Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism and Ibn 
Khaldunism in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters,” Journal of 
Asian and African Studies, 18/3–4 (1983); B. Lewis, “Ibn Khaldun 
in Turkey,” in Studies in Islamic History and Civilization: In Hon-
our of Professor David Ayalon, ed. Moshe Sharon (Leiden, 1986); 
E. Okumuş, “İbn Haldun ve Osmanlı’da Çöküş Tartışmaları,” Di-
van: Disiplinlerarası Çalışmalar Dergisi, 6 (1999).
larly during World War I and its aftermath. It discusses 
an important debate between pro-Ottoman actors and 
Arab nationalists on what is known as the “Quraysh 
question,” which centered on a hadith that states that 
the caliph must be a member of the Quraysh tribe of 
Mecca (of which Prophet Muhammad was a member) 
as a precondition for caliphate. In this connection, 
the article analyzes how Ibn Khaldun’s interpretation 
of this problem was appropriated by Ottoman intel-
lectuals and political actors in relation to the “Arab 
caliphate” project that developed in the context of 
British and French colonialism in the Middle East. 
While Arab nationalists stressed the ethnic back-
ground of the leader as a fundamental precondition 
for caliphate, Ottoman supporters chose to embrace 
the Khaldunian theory instead, which emphasized the 
asabiyya of the caliph’s rule, rather than his genealogy 
or tribal affiliation.
The Historical Context
Since the Qurʾan does not contain prescriptions for 
any specific political system, but rather emphasizes 
only general principles (such as justice, consultation, 
and preventing oppression), the theory of the caliph-
ate was derived from the practices of Muslim society 
during the period c.e. 610–660. This society dur-
ing these fifty years was under the leadership of the 
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Prophet Muhammad and the first four caliphs (Abu 
Bakr, Omar, Othman, and Ali), who are regarded as 
the “best of mankind after the prophets,” especially 
by Sunni Muslims. The classical theory found in the 
Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah (“The Rules of Government”) 
literature that first emerged in the eleventh cen-
tury3  defined the caliphate as “a succession from the 
Prophet, and as such, a general leadership/authority 
on matters of religion and the world.”4 It proposes 
that a caliph should be just, knowledgeable and virtu-
ous, and must be either elected by the Ahl al-hal wa 
al-ʿaqd (the prominent members of the Muslim com-
munity) or appointed by a previous caliph, and then 
approved by the larger community by getting its bayʾah 
(“consent”). This early literature often emphasizes the 
legitimacy and significance of the first four “rightly-
guided caliphs” while maintaining the illegitimacy of 
the Umayyad  caliphate (661–750). Later, the Abbasid 
dynasty (751–1258) was usually regarded as legitimate 
by the ulema. When the Islamic world was in chaos in 
the eleventh and thirteenth centuries as a result of the 
Buwayhi and Mongolian invasions, respectively, some 
scholars, including Ibn Khaldun, viewed political and 
military power (as opposed to genealogy) as a legiti-
mate source of authority for the caliph.5
Some of the early political theorists of Islam 
(e.g., al-Mawardi [972–1058]) also stipulated that 
the caliphate belonged to the Prophetic family and 
therefore the caliph should be a descendant of the 
Prophet Muhammad. This argument was based on 
an authentic tradition of the Prophet, known as the 
Quraysh ha dith, which stated that “Imams are from 
the Quraysh.”6 This genealogical requirement was a 
problem for neither the Umayyads nor the Abbasids, 
since both of these dynasties had branched out from 
the Prophet’s blood relatives. Following the Mongo-
3 See, e.g., A. al-Mawardi, Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah wa al-Wilayat 
al-Diniyyah, 2nd ed. (Beirut, 1994); S. al-ʿAmidi, al-Ihkam fi 
al-Usul al-Ahkam vol. 4, (Beirut, 1992); S. al-Taftazani, Sharh 
al-Maqasid, 5 vols. (Beirut, 1989); Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyah, Al-
Ṭuruq al-Hukmīyah fī al-Siyāsah al-Sharʾiah (Cairo, 1953); A. Ibn 
Khaldūn, Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, (ed. ʿ Ali ʿ Abd al-Wāḥid Wāfī), 
4 vols. (Cairo, 1957).
4 al-Taftazani, Sharh al-Maqasid, V, 232; al-Mawardi, Ahkam al-
Sultaniyyah wa al-Wilayat al-Diniyyah, 3.
5 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, 
tr. F. Rosenthal (Princeton, NJ, 1958), I, 399–402; see also T. W. 
Arnold, The Caliphate (London, 1965); C. Avcı, “Hilafet” TDV 
İslam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 17 (İstanbul, 1998).
6 Hakim al-Nishaburî, al-Mustadrak ʿala al-Sahîhayn (Beirut, 
1990/1411), IV, 76.
lian invasions in 1258, however, the “Quraysh con-
dition” became problematic as the Abbasid dynasty 
collapsed, and the descendants of the Prophet in the 
Sunni world lost their political and military power.
In light of this development, a number of Sunni 
theorists, including ʿAyni, al-Jurjani, al-Baqillani and 
Ibn Khaldun (the first three being leading theolo-
gians), discarded the Qurayshite descent as an es-
sential element of the Sunni theory of the caliphate.7 
They argued that the ruling contained in the Quraysh 
hadith was specific to the period of the Prophet and 
the first four caliphs (610–660), and that the hadith 
was no longer applicable under the new circumstances. 
Ibn Khaldun in particular argued that the reason the 
Prophet Muhammad mentioned the Quraysh tribe 
in the hadith was related to their strong asabiyya at 
the time: Mecca was the only polity that was strong 
enough to bring together all other tribes under the 
rule of one—the Quraysh—and thus unite the Mus-
lim community. He argued that since the Quraysh 
were no longer the dominant dynastic group in the 
Muslim world (because the power of its asabiyya had 
declined), this hadith was no longer applicable. Ibn 
Khaldun thus argued:
[A] direct relationship with the Prophet . . . ex-
ists [in the case of Qurayshite descent], and it is a 
blessing. However, it is known that the religious 
law has not as its purpose to provide blessings. 
Therefore, if descent be made a condition [of 
the imamate], there must be a [public] interest 
which was the purpose behind making it into 
law. If we probe into the matter and analyze 
it, we find that the [public] interest is nothing 
else but regard for group feeling [asabiyya]. . . . 
Therefore we consider it a [necessary] condi-
tion for the person in charge of the affairs of 
the Muslims that he belong to people who pos-
sess a strong group feeling, superior to that of 
their contemporaries, so that they can force the 
others to follow them and the whole thing can 
be united for effective protection. . . .
Furthermore, [the world of] existence attests to 
[the necessity of group feeling for the caliphate]. 
Only he who has gained superiority over a nation 
or a race is able to handle affairs. The religious 
law would hardly ever make a requirement in 
7 Arnold, Caliphate, 74–76; Avcı, “Hilafet.”
This content downloaded from 213.14.29.75 on Mon, 16 May 2016 10:58:37 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Genealogy or Asabiyya? F 317
contradiction to the requirements of existence. 
And God, He is exalted, knows better.8
Hence for Ibn Khaldun, the Quraysh condition could 
be discarded as an element of caliphate theory. In-
stead, Ibn Khaldun and others emphasized political 
and military power as fundamental preconditions for 
being caliph, already included in the classical theory 
of the caliphate. The presence of a number of hadiths 
that denied the Quraysh tribe any religious or polit-
ical privilege (see below) also justified the  Khaldunian 
position.
With the decline of the Abbasid caliphate, the 
Otto man Empire took over the caliphal flag. Selim I 
(reigned 1512–1520) “transferred” the caliphate from 
Cairo to Istanbul in 1517, after which his descendants 
carried the title of the caliph until after the collapse of 
the Ottoman Empire in 1922. The official Ottoman 
historiography claims that the last Abbasid Caliph, 
Mutawakkil ʿAlallah III, voluntarily left his title to 
the Ottoman Sultan, Selim I, in a ceremony that took 
place in the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul.9 Some modern 
historians dispute the “transfer” of the caliphate from 
the Mamluks to the Ottomans on the grounds that 
no such ceremony is recorded in historical sources; 
they argue instead that it was invented by the 18th-
century historian D’Ohsson, whose work was the first 
to mention it.10 However, this argument is narrowly 
focused on the ‘ceremony’, and misses the main point: 
a ceremony was not required, or had ever occurred, 
 before Selim I, for the transfer of the caliphate.
The real legal issue for the Ottomans was the prob-
lem of the caliph’s genealogy. Moreover, according to 
many historical sources, Ottoman sultans used the title 
Caliph both before—at least since Murad II (1421–
1451)—and after Selim I.11 However, starting from 
Selim I, they also used the title of Great Caliph (Hal-
ife-i Uzma) in official documents, and asked in their 
letters to other Muslims rulers that they be  recognized 
8 Ibn Khaldūn, The Muqaddimah, I, 399, 401–402.
9 See I. D’Ohsson, Tableau general de l’empire othoman, 3 vols. 
(Paris, 1790), I, 269–70.
10 See V. Barthold “Halife ve Sultan,” Mir Islama, 1912 (HR, 
vol. 3, 2003); C. A. Nallino Hilafet, 1917 (HR, vol. 4, 2004); 
T. W. Arnold, Caliphate, 1965; H. İnalcık, “The Ottomans and the 
Caliphate” in The Cambridge History of Islam, vol. 1A, ed. P. M. 
Holt, A. Lambton and B. Lewis (Cambridge, 1977); K. Karpat, 
The Politicization of Islam: Reconstructing Identity, State, Faith, and 
Community in the Late Ottoman State (New York, 2001).
11 A. Özcan “Hilafet – Osmanlılar” TDV İslam Ansiklopedisi, 
vol. 17. (İstanbul, 1998), 546.
as the true caliphs of the Muslim world in an attempt 
to revive the political power of the  caliphate.12 Fur-
thermore, the argument that  Ottoman sultans claimed 
this title only when the Empire was weak13 is also 
contradicted by historical evidence. For example, the 
powerful sultan Mehmed II (1451–1481) was referred 
to as “Caliph” by contemporary sources; similarly, Sü-
leyman I (1520–1566), in whose reign the Ottoman 
Empire was at the peak of its military and political 
power, was one of the sultans who most frequently 
used this title.14 In fact, in his letters to less powerful 
rulers he demanded that his caliphate be recognized 
by them.15
Obviously, the Ottomans were not of prophetic 
descent; notwithstanding, the Quraysh condition did 
not emerge as a major problem for them during the 
classical period of the Empire (sixteenth to eighteenth 
centuries), since the Ottomans were the strongest 
Muslim state at the time, with virtually no challengers. 
The Quraysh condition remained only a theoretical 
problem, which was relatively easily addressed by the 
Ottomans, who often drew on Ibn Khaldun’s inter-
pretation of the Quraysh hadith.
Although it has been argued that Ibn Khaldun 
was first “discovered” by Orientalists in the context 
of  European colonialism in the nineteenth century 
and that he “was not a famous Muslim scholar be-
fore he achieved fame among non-Muslims of expan-
sionist Europe,”16 recent research has shown that this 
was not true: there were many manuscript (and, later, 
published) copies of the Muqaddima in the libraries 
of Istanbul and other Ottoman cities, and many com-
mentaries were written on it by pre-nineteenth century 
12 See Barthold, “Halife ve Sultan,” 322; A. Reid, “Nineteenth 
Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia”, The Journal of Asian 
Studies, 26/2 (1967): 268–72, M. Y. Mughul, Kanuni Devri (An-
kara, 1987), 88, A. Özcan, Pan–İslamizm: Osmanlı Devleti Hindis-
tan Müslümanları ve İngiltere (1877–1924), (İstanbul, 1997), 12.
13 See, e.g., S. Akgün, Halifeliğin Kaldırılması ve Laiklik 
(İstanbul, 2006).
14 H. İnalcık, “Osmanlı Padişahı,” AÜSBF Dergisi 12/4 (1958): 
70.
15 M. Gökbilgin, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman (İstanbul, 1992), 
96–99. I do not wish to imply that the Ottoman rulers were ac-
cepted by everyone as a universal leader (caliph) of the Muslim 
ummah, only that they tried to get other rulers’ recognition and to 
revive the political power of the caliphate, starting from the mid-
sixteenth century.
16 See, e.g., B. Lawrence, ed., Ibn Khaldun and Islamic Ideology, 
(Leiden, 1984), 5.
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Ottoman scholars.17 Moreover, Cornell Fleischer has 
shown that Ottoman intellectuals knew the Muqa-
ddima at the end of the sixteenth century, and that 
such leading scholars as Kâtip Çelebi and Naimâ in the 
seventeenth century made explicit references to Ibn 
Khaldun.18 Furthermore, the Muqaddima gained pop-
ularity and was translated into Ottoman Turkish in the 
early eighteenth century, when Sheikh al-Islam Pîrîzâde 
Mehmed Sâhib Efendi (d. 1749) translated (and com-
mented on) the first two-thirds of the book between 
1725 and 1730, which was the Muqaddima’s first-ever 
translation from Arabic. A century later, the rest of the 
book was translated in part by İsmail Ferruh Efendi 
(Bulaq 1274/1857; Istanbul 1275/1858) and then 
in full by the scholar and Grand Vizier Ahmed Cevdet 
Pasha (d. 1895), who published the entire translation in 
 Istanbul in 1860.19 Therefore, it is safe to say that Ibn 
Khaldun was widely read by the Ottoman intellectuals 
and statesmen at least since the late sixteenth century.20
Ottoman jurists and intellectuals embraced the 
Khaldunian position (though not necessarily directly 
from him21) on the Quraysh issue early on. For ex-
ample, the historian Lütfi Pasha, who was also Sul-
tan Süleyman I’s Grand Vizier, solved this potential 
 legitimization problem by justifying the absence of 
the Quraysh condition in the Ottoman dynasty on 
the grounds that the law was limited to the first four 
 caliphs.22 Lütfi Pasha said that if a ruler combines in 
himself the principles of “the maintenance of faith 
with justice, command of the good and prohibition 
of evil, and general leadership—then he is a Sultan 
who has a just claim to the application of the names 
of Imam and Khalifa and Wali and Amir without 
contradiction.”23
17 Y. Yıldırım, “Giriş: Mukaddime’nin Osmanlı Tercümesi,” in 
Mukaddime: Osmanlı Tercümesi, ed. Y. Yıldırım, et al. (İstanbul, 
2008), 27–28. The historian Naimâ himself claimed that the six-
teenth century scholar Kınalızade had taken the idea of the “Circle 
of Equity” directly from Ibn Khaldun (ibid., 201).
18 Fleischer, “Royal Authority”: 199–201.
19 A transliteration of this Ottoman translation into the Latin 
alphabet has recently been published in three volumes: Y. Yıldırım, 
et al. eds., Mukaddime).
20 See also Özcan, “Hilafet – Osmanlılar,” and Fleischer, “Royal 
Authority.”
21 As mentioned above, a similar interpretation of the Quraysh 
question had been presented previous to Ibn Khaldun by such 
scholars as ʿAyni, Jurjani and Baqillani. See also footnote 17.
22 See H. A. R. Gibb, “Lutfi Pasha on the Ottoman Caliphate,” 
Oriens XV (1962): 287–95.
23 Quoted in Gibb, “Lutfi Pasha”: 290. By focusing on the ge-
nealogy vs. asabiyya issue, I do not wish to imply that the whole 
endeavor of legitimating the Ottoman caliphal rule was dependent 
The debate over the “Quraysh condition” for the 
caliphate was, as mentioned above, revived in the late 
Ottoman era (late nineteenth century) when Arab 
nationalists, with the “encouragement” of the British 
and the French, made a claim for an Arab Caliph-
ate. The proponents of the “Arab Caliphate,” such 
as Egyptian intellectuals Abdur-rahman al-Kawakibi 
and Rashid Rida, based their objection to Ottoman 
rule on the claim that the Ottoman sultans had seized 
the caliphate from the Abbasids by force, and that 
Arabs had a religious and historical right to the ca-
liphate. In particular, they claimed that the caliph 
should be a member of the Quraysh tribe, based on 
the Quraysh hadith. This claim in particular, and Arab 
nationalism in general, had a close connection with 
the international political context of the early twen-
tieth century—i.e., with British and French colonial 
activities. Both Britain and France had plans to install 
‘puppet’ caliphs in the Arab world to politically and 
ideologically control Muslims in colonial India and 
North Africa. The French were planning to create 
a “Maghrib caliphate” by installing Sultan Yusuf of 
Morocco as caliph, whereas the British wanted to cre-
ate an “Arab caliphate” under their own control by 
helping Sharif Hussein of Mecca declare his rule.24 
The main aim of the colonial powers was to break the 
political and ideological power of the Ottoman sultan 
on their Muslim colonies, and ultimately to destroy 
the Ottoman caliphate, which was a real threat to their 
interests in the Muslim World. For this purpose, they 
started an anti-Ottoman campaign, which involved 
the effective propaganda for the illegitimacy of the 
Ottoman caliphate (discussed above) that also affected 
Arab nationalist intellectuals and politicians.
The Problem of Alternative Caliphs 
and the Quraysh Hadith
Supported by both the major colonial powers (except 
for Germany) and the European press, the Arab na-
upon Ibn Khaldun’s (and others’) theory of the caliphate only; the 
Ottoman statesmen and intellectuals mobilized other political, mili-
tary and ideological resources, too. My discussion here has a nar-
rower focus than explaining all the relevant factors that were at work 
in the Ottoman claim for caliphate.
24 Y. H. Bayur, Türk İnkılabı Tarihi vol. III (Ankara, 1983), 
297–301; A. Satan, Halifeliğin Kaldırılması (Istanbul, 2008), 39. 
For an analysis of the French project of the “Maghrib caliphate” in 
the context of Ottoman-Maghrib relations, see N. Ardıç, ةفلاخلا”” 
“ملاسلاا ةيداحتا و رامعتسلاا نيب  “ةيبرغملا in Proceedings of the Interna-
tional Congress on “The Maghrib and the Western Mediterranean in 
the Ottoman Era,” ed. C. Tomar (Rabat, forthcoming).
This content downloaded from 213.14.29.75 on Mon, 16 May 2016 10:58:37 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Genealogy or Asabiyya? F 319
tionalist movement flourished, particularly in Syria and 
Egypt. Arab nationalists often brought up the Quraysh 
condition primarily in order to question the legitimacy 
of the Ottoman sultan’s status as the “Caliph of all Mus-
lims.” They also emphasized this issue (and utilized the 
famous hadith as a basis for it) as a discursive ground 
on which claims for an Arab caliphate could be built. 
In fact, later, when Sharif Hussein of Mecca and King 
Fuad of Egypt made claims for the caliphate in 1924 
and 1926 respectively, their supporters would often 
resort to the Quraysh hadith to justify their claims.
On the other hand, pro-Ottoman intellectuals and 
politicians responded to the Arab nationalist (and Eu-
ropean) challenge to the Ottoman caliph by empha-
sizing his status as the only legitimate leader of the 
Muslim ummah. They also strongly stressed the ille-
gitimacy of the claims for alternative caliphates by Arab 
leaders. A major discursive strategy they employed as 
part of this struggle was invoking the canonic texts 
of Islam, i.e., the Qurʾan and the prophetic hadith. 
They particularly resorted to the famous “ul al-amr” 
verse (Qurʾan, 5:59) that commands to obey God, 
the Prophet and “those vested with authority among 
[Muslims].” This Qurʾanic verse, along with certain 
hadiths, was particularly useful for the supporters of 
the Ottoman sultan due to the fact that the Qurʾan 
and the prophetic hadiths had an unquestionable au-
thority for Muslims.
In addition to referencing Qurʾanic verses and pro-
phetic traditions for legitimization purposes, many of 
the pro-Ottoman actors also invoked them for bring-
ing up more specific themes to defend the Ottoman 
caliphate. One of the more popular themes in this con-
text was the question of alternative caliphates. During 
World War I this question turned out to be a significant 
problem for the Ottoman political center, which had 
been greatly weakened by then. Some local leaders, 
such as Sharif Hussein, the Sharif of Mecca, and Yusuf, 
the Sultan of Morocco, sought to base their claims for 
caliphate on their purported prophetic descent.
To support the Ottoman caliphate against these 
claims, some activists who had ties to the Commit-
tee of Union and Progress (CUP), the ruling party 
in Istanbul, published several declarations, pamphlets 
and books. For example, Muhammad Safa, who was 
an Egyptian journalist and a member of the Ottoman 
secret service, the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa, wrote a book, 
entitled The Islamic Caliphate and the Ottomans.25 
25 M. Safa, Hilafet-i İslamiye ve Al-i Osman, 1922 (HR, vol. 5, 
2005).
Published in Istanbul both in Arabic and Turkish, the 
book was a direct critique of Arab nationalists and 
their use of the Quraysh argument. The dissemination 
of such publications in the Middle East, North Africa 
and Europe was largely funded by the CUP. These 
publications presented the Ottoman Empire as the 
“Great Caliphate” (Hilafet-i Uzma), emphasizing that 
on religious grounds there could only be one caliph at 
a time, and accusing the competing claims as heretical 
and the principal cause of disunity among Muslims. 
Accordingly, they presented the “false caliphs” as pup-
pets of the imperialist powers—Britain, France and 
Italy. The Islamic discourse on the question of mul-
tiple caliphs found in these pro-Ottoman publications 
tended to rely heavily on prophetic traditions.
This theme was dominant particularly in the writ-
ings of North African and Arab traditionalist scholar-
activists in support of the Ottoman position—such 
as Sheikh Ismail Safayihi, Salih Sharif Tunusi, Sheikh 
Salih Yafi and Muhammad Safa, who all quoted dif-
ferent versions of the same hadith that stated that if a 
rival imam (caliph) were to emerge with a claim for 
leadership, he should be punished by death for violat-
ing God’s command and disturbing the unity of the 
Muslim ummah.26 Similarly, Mukhtar Ahmad Ansari, 
the president of the Muslim League of India (1918–
1920), a member of the Indian National Congress, 
and a friend of Gandhi’s, cited the same hadith (to-
gether with Qurʾanic verse 26:49), referred to Sharif 
Hussein by name, and accused him of back-stabbing 
the Muslim world in the midst of war by revolting 
against the legitimate “Caliph of Islam” and therefore 
violating an important principle of the Sharia:
Carried away by his ambition and selfish inter-
ests, Sharif Hussein revolted against the Caliph 
of Islam, who was to be unquestionably obeyed, 
as he himself admits. By doing this, he not only 
violated a principle of civilized ethics, but he 
also failed to observe a command by Allah and 
His Messenger as described in the Muslim faith 
and religious teachings. . . .The Prophet said 
that “Evil tithes will come repeatedly. But he 
who seeks to separate this ummah, which is a 
26 S. I. Safayihi, Iqaz al-Ikhwan li-Dasais al-Aʾda wa Ma Yaqtad-
hih Hal al-Zaman (1915/1331), (HR, vol. 4, 2004) 69–70; S. S. 
Tunusi, Sharkhu Dasais al-Fransees Zidda al-Islam wa Khalifatih 
1916, (HR, vol. 4, 2004) 149; S. Yafi, Hilafet ve  Osmaniyet (Beirut, 
1334/1916), (HR, vol. 4, 2004) 165; M. Safa, Hilafet-i İslamiye 
ve Al-i Osman.
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united community, slay him with the sword, be 
he who he may.”27
Likewise, in the last of his three pamphlets on the 
caliphate, Tunusi, a scholar and intellectual from the 
Maghrib, criticized the Moroccan sultan, citing a dif-
ferent hadith (“Whoever creates dissension within, 
or tries to separate from, the ummah is acting with 
Satan”28) and accused him of committing a great sin.29 
This discourse was part of an effort to resist the ap-
parent disintegration of the Muslim world by saving 
the Ottoman caliphate at a time when that world 
was undergoing an intense process of colonization 
by the European powers. The prophetic hadiths that 
emphasized Muslim unity were thought to be effec-
tive sources by the pro-Ottoman actors against the 
“separatist” claims for alternative caliphates.
As part of the same effort, some intellectuals who 
supported the Ottoman sultan felt compelled to re-
spond to what is known as the “Quraysh question”—
that of the caliph’s ethnic connection to the Quraysh 
tribe. As mentioned above, this problem emerged 
when Britain, France and Italy began to be concerned 
about the Ottoman Caliph Abdülhamid II’s potential 
destabilizing influence on Muslims living in their colo-
nies in India, the Middle East and North Africa in the 
last quarter of the 19th century. When Abdülhamid 
was deposed and replaced by a weak caliph in 1908, 
the European powers accelerated their efforts to un-
dermine the caliphate with anti-Ottoman propaganda 
in their colonies, claiming that a Turkish caliph who 
had not come from a Quraysh tribe could not be a 
true one, and that the Ottomans had seized this title 
by force from the true Arab (Abbasid) caliph in the 
sixteenth century.
At this point, the powerful CUP government 
started to pursue—however temporarily and par-
tially—a policy of Panturkism (unification of Turkic 
peoples), in addition to Panislamism. When some Arab 
nationalist ulema, led by al-Kawakibi (1854–1902), 
“re- discovered” (à la Hobsbawm’s “invention of tradi-
tion”) and re-popularized the hadith of the Prophet 
(“Imams are from the Quraysh”30), they took up the 
27 M. A. Ansari, Umum Hindistan Cemiyet-i İslamiyesi Kabul 
Heyeti (1919) (HR, vol. 4, 2004), 376.
28 A. Ibn Hanbal, Musnad (6 vols. Cairo, 1312–13/1895), I: 
18, 26.
29 S. Tunusi, Hilafet-i Muazzama-i İslamiye (1916) (HR, vol. 4, 
2004), 426.
30 al-Nishaburî, al-Mustadrak ʿala al-Sahîhayn, IV: 76.
Europeans’ claims and legitimized them with refer-
ence to this particular hadith. Arab nationalists such 
as Sharif Hussein and al-Kawakibi constantly exploited 
the hadith as part of their plans to establish an Arab ca-
liphate after gaining independence from the Ottoman 
Empire. Many Arab nationalists, including Rashid 
Rida, discussed the hadith in detail in their writings 
on the caliphate. Referring to such classical theorists 
as al-Mawardi, al-Taftazani and Ibn Humam, Rida 
described in detail how being the Prophet’s descen-
dant was a fundamental prerequisite for the caliphate, 
which was supposed to be a single and exclusive rule.31 
This, he argued, nullified the caliphate of the Ottoman 
sultans, which clearly violated this principle:
The Quraysh condition has been agreed upon 
by all ulema resulting in an ijma [scholarly con-
sensus]; it [the hadith] was reported by reliable 
hadith scholars, and all the Sunni theologians 
and jurists have used it as evidence. Moreover, 
the historical practice has always been in this line 
since the people of Medina accepted a Prophet 
from Quraysh and obeyed him. The ummah, 
too, has always obeyed him for centuries now; 
so much so that nobody has ever dared to seize 
the caliphate by force, other than the Turks 
who forced the Abbasids to recognize their 
suzerainty. . . .32
The idea that the caliph was required to be a mem-
ber of the Quraysh tribe was a discursive strategy 
based on the unquestionable authority of Prophet 
Muhammad in Islam. It was a very useful instrument 
for Arab nationalists because it both legitimized their 
plans to secede from the Ottoman Empire and accom-
plished this through a religious discourse: the hadith 
implied, on the one hand, that the Ottoman rule in 
the Arab world was not a legitimate one, and that 
Arabs had a religious (hence unquestionable) right to 
caliphate, on the other. It was also useful in terms of 
shielding the Arab nationalist movement against the 
potential charge that nationalism was an un- Islamic 
ideology. In this case, an Islamic justification was in-
dispensible for the nationalists because religion was 
the ultimate source of legitimacy in Muslim society.
31 M. R. Rida, al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-ʿUzma (Cairo, 
1923/1341), 18–25.
32 Ibid., 19.
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Yet pro-Ottoman actors, too, resorted to religious 
justification in their critique of the Arab nationalist 
movement. Those living in the peripheral provinces 
of the caliphate such as those in North Africa—Egypt 
in particular—quickly reacted to the Arab nationalist 
movement, perceiving it as a real threat to Muslim 
unity under the existing caliphate. The primary dis-
cursive strategy in their response was to invoke sacred 
texts of Islam, particularly the prophetic traditions, 
as well as resorting to the help of Islamic intellectual 
tradition, including the works of Ibn Khaldun.
Pro-Ottoman actors applied two main discur-
sive techniques against the nationalist claim for the 
Quraysh condition. First, they cited several hadiths 
that denied any ethnic requirement for the leader-
ship of the ummah. Secondly, they re-interpreted the 
Quraysh hadith, which was technically an authentic 
(i.e., irrefutable) one, in a way that allowed them to 
justify a non-Quraysh ruler’s caliphate. As mentioned 
above, they derived this reinterpretation from such 
leading classical scholars as Ibn Khaldun, ʿAyni, al-
Jurjani and al-Baqillani, who had argued that, in the 
hadith, the Prophet mentioned the Quraysh not be-
cause of his ethnic identity, but because it was the only 
tribe at the time that was able to unite all tribes under 
its leadership due to its special political and ideologi-
cal status. Thus, the strongest available state (i.e., the 
Ottoman Empire) could now assume this title based 
on its paramount asabiyya.
Ibn Khaldun had lived and produced his work in 
a context in which the Muslim world was in chaos 
following the Mongolian invasions. This chaotic sit-
uation was epitomized by the fall of Baghdad in 1258 
on the one hand, and the social and political disinte-
gration of Muslim society in North Africa and Iberia 
during the same century on the other. The political 
turmoil without doubt affected Ibn Khaldun’s view 
of the caliphate.
Therefore, it is no surprise that the later Otto-
mans, who were under similarly chaotic political and 
military conditions, took up the Khaldunian theory 
of the caliphate. The post-World War I period was 
characterized by a political crisis in which the sup-
porters of the Ottoman caliphate had to defend it 
against intellectual attacks by European imperialists 
and Arab nationalists.33 They saw Arab nationalism 
33 By drawing parallels between fourteenth-century Maghreb 
and the early twentieth-century Mediterranean, I do not mean to 
as a separatist movement supported by Britain and 
France during the first quarter of the twentieth cen-
tury. For this reason, they heavily emphasized the idea 
(and policy) of the unification of Muslims (İttihad-ı 
İslam) already put into effect by Abdülhamid II in 
the last two decades of the nineteenth century. As 
part of this strategy, the Ottoman(ist) intellectuals and 
political leaders embraced the Khaldunian theory of 
the caliphate and his interpretation of the Quraysh 
question. Those who opposed the Ottoman caliphate, 
on the other hand, mostly ignored the Khaldunian 
approach—which was a discursive technique in itself—
and  focused exclusively on the Quraysh hadith. Unlike 
the anti-Ottoman camp, however, some (though not 
all) of the Ottoman supporters took the challenge 
posed by the Quraysh issue head-on, responding to 
it from the Khaldunian point of view. They tried to 
prove that the ruling contained in the hadith could not 
be applicable under current circumstances, and some-
times presented lengthy discussions of the problem.34
Among the pro-Ottoman intellectuals, Ismail Sa-
fayihi, the former Chief Justice of Tunisia, delved 
into a detailed discussion of the Quraysh hadith and 
presented a number of other hadiths as counter-evi-
dence in his book entitled Warning [Muslim] Brothers 
against the Tactics of the Enemy, which he wrote during 
World War I.35 Reviewing the relevant Islamic litera-
ture with sophisticated argumentation in the  manner 
of a classical scholar, he stated that the “Quraysh 
hadith” was no longer applicable due to the above-
mentioned Khaldunian argument and the presence of 
say that there was continuity in this respect over six centuries, nor 
do I want to imply a paucity of ideological resources that Muslims 
could mobilize in the latter period. I only argue, within the confines 
of the article, that drawing on the Khaldunian theory of the caliph-
ate was one of many discursive tools that pro-Ottoman actors used 
in their politico-ideological struggle against anti-caliphate move-
ments, particularly Arab nationalists, during this period. Elsewhere 
I have identified twenty different discursive strategies (in the Fou-
caultian sense) and many other “discursive techniques” (more spe-
cific strategies that make up the former), which the actors deployed 
to justify or undermine the Ottoman caliphate during the late-19th 
and early 20th centuries (see N. Ardıç, Islam and the Politics of 
Secularism, [London, 2012]). Invoking Ibn Khaldun’s justification 
of caliphal rule was one such discursive technique.
34 E.g., Safayihi, Iqaz al-Ikhwan, 55–63; A. Jawish, Hilafet-i 
İslamiye (Istanbul, 1334/1916), (HR, vol. 4, 2004), 246–49; Said 
Halim Pasha, L’Empire Ottoman et la Guerre Mondiale (Istanbul, 
1920/2000), 400; M. Seyyid Bey, Hilafet ve Hakimiyet-i Milliye 
(Ankara, 1339/1923), 12; Hoca Şükrü, Hilafet-i İslamiye ve Büyük 
Millet Meclisi (Ankara, 1339/1923), 10–11.
35 Safayihi, Iqaz al-Ikhwan, 55ff.
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other hadiths that negated the notion of ethnicity as a 
prerequisite for the caliphate. In his argument on the 
Quraysh condition, Safayihi downplayed the role of 
genealogy in favor of asabiyya:
Although the Qurayshite descent is a precon-
dition for the Caliphate, as stipulated by the 
majority of the ulema (jumhur), it is not a pre-
condition that is always required. . . . Otherwise, 
being a Hashemite would be required, rather 
than being a Quraysh member. What is necessary 
is the power that comes from the genealogical 
strength. . . . In the past, this [power] was found 
in the Quraysh; [today, it is not]. Therefore, be-
cause the aim of the hadith is realized, it be-
comes valid and true for those rulers who lead 
Muslims after the Quraysh rule—even if they are 
not from the Quraysh.36
Citing a Qurʾanic verse (49:13) that states that ethnic 
ties are unimportant in the eyes of God, Sheikh Sa-
fayihi concluded that the Quraysh hadith in fact also 
justified the rule by other dynasties that had enough 
power to unite Muslims.
Sheikh Tunusi, another North African scholar 
who was concerned about a rival caliph in the region 
claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet, cited 
a popular hadith as counter-evidence to that of the 
Quraysh hadith :37 “Obey your leader even if he is an 
Abyssinian slave with a small head.”38 He repeated it 
in a later pamphlet in the context of preconditions 
for the caliphate, the most important of which, he 
argued, was the ability/power to defend the rights 
of Muslims, which was at that time enjoyed only by 
the Ottomans.39 Similarly, İsmail Hakkı, a prominent 
Turkish scholar and CUP member, cited the same 
hadith (“Obey your leader even if he is an Abyssin-
ian slave . . .”) in his short discussion of the original 
Quraysh hadith, adding that some of the Companions 
of the Prophet and classical ulema also held his po-
sition.40 Similarly, in his book criticizing the British 
efforts to undermine the Ottoman caliphate, Hussein 
Kidwai, a lawyer, politician and member of the Muslim 
League of India and the Indian Caliphate Movement, 
36 Ibid., 59–60.
37 Tunusi, Sharkhu Dasais al-Fransees, 148.
38 M. Bukhari, Sahîh Al-Bukharî, 5 vols. (Gujranwala, n.d.): 
“Adhan,” 4, 5, 156; “Ahkam” 4.
39 Tunusi, Hilafet-i Muazzama-i İslamiye, 425.
40 İ. Hakkı “Hilafet-i İslamiye,” Sırat-ı Müstakim, vol. III, no. 
56 (September 17th (1325/1910) (HR, vol. 3 2003): 439.
referred to another version of the same hadith, say-
ing that even if the leader was a former Abyssinian 
prisoner of war, he would enjoy the same status as 
a Meccan of pure Arab origins, as long as he was a 
Muslim leader.41
Finally, some pro-Ottoman actors brought up Ibn 
Khaldun’s interpretation of the Quraysh question in 
the context of the concept of justice as the fundamen-
tal element of the caliphal rule, which they emphasized 
to downplay the significance of the Quraysh condi-
tion. Resorting to the familiar discursive strategy of 
citing Qurʾanic verses, they discussed “maintaining 
justice” as one of the basic characteristics and duties 
of the ideal Caliph. The idea in the classical theory 
of the caliphate that the main duty of a caliph was to 
maintain justice is based on a famous Qurʾanic verse 
(16:90) that reads: “Allah commands justice, the  doing 
of good, and liberality to kith and kin, and He forbids 
all shameful deeds, and injustice and rebellion.” In this 
context, İsmail Hakkı refused the alleged requirement 
that caliphs must be a member of one of the Quraysh 
tribes in his discussion on “maintaining justice” as a 
basic element of an Islamic government. He cited a 
verse (Qurʾan 42:13) that ordered the Muslim com-
munity not to be divided within itself, in order to 
support his argument—which he in turn derived from 
Ibn Khaldun, i.e., that the Quraysh  requirement was 
originally devised to prevent divisions among Mus-
lims, which no longer applied under the Ottoman 
caliphate. Hakkı’s view of the Quraysh issue clearly 
favored asabiyya over genealogy:
The ummah has had no disagreement on the 
conditions [for holding the caliphate] of wis-
dom, justice, competence, and physical and 
mental well-being. These four are commonly 
agreed-upon conditions. There is a disagreement 
only on the Quraysh condition. As Ibn Khaldun 
explains, being from the Quraysh was stipulated 
[for the Caliph] in the early [periods of] Islam 
in order to prevent divisions. The Quraysh had 
power and prestige over other nations. They 
had an asabiyya strong enough to govern other 
people. . . . Later the Quraysh lost their strong 
asabiyya. Having a strong asabiyya to govern the 
ummah is not confined to the Quraysh. For this 
41 M. H. Kidwai, Türkiya İslam İmparatorluğuʾnun İstikbali 
(1919) (HR, vol. 5, 2005), 352.
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reason, this condition is not required [to hold 
the caliphate].42
During World War I, as discussed above, Britain 
and France had plans to install Arab caliphs whom they 
could control directly in their Muslim colonies. The 
pro-Arab propaganda, which was partly based on the 
principle of the Quraysh descent for the caliph, caused 
a fury among the pro-Ottoman actors, especially in 
North Africa and Arabia, where the Arab nationalist 
influences were most intensely felt. Among the Otto-
man supporters who tried to counter this propaganda 
was the Tunisian-Egyptian intellectual Abdulaziz 
Jawish, who was also a high-ranking Teşkilat officer 
in North Africa.43 In his critique of the rival caliphs 
in the Arab world, Jawish accused the French of ma-
nipulating the Moroccan sultan in his claim for the 
caliphate.44 In his book, which was published in Istan-
bul by the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa in Arabic and translated 
into Turkish the same year,45 he also resorted to the 
discursive strategy of discussing the Quraysh hadith 
in detail and citing other hadiths to counter it. For 
example, he referred to a hadith that orders Muslims 
not to collaborate with pagans, and warned North 
African Muslims not to be taken in by false promises 
from the French government, which was an enemy of 
Islam like the pagans of Mecca.46
The debate over Quraysh descent for the caliph, 
in which the Khaldunian theory of the caliphate was 
often invoked, was a relatively significant one un-
til the end of World War I. After the war was over, 
the Quraysh question became part of an academic 
rather than political debate in the caliphal center 
in its waning years. Interestingly, even the secular-
ists who wanted to get rid of the Ottoman caliphate 
did not support the Arab nationalist argument for 
42 İ. Hakkı “Hilafet-i İslamiye,” 439. Interestingly, while pro-
Ottoman actors tried to counter the ‘Quraysh argument’ by trivial-
izing it, writer Kadir Mısıroğlu, a representative of the ‘Islamist’ 
camp in the contemporary literature on the caliphate, claims that 
the Ottomans were actually descendants of Prophet Muhammad 
(K. Mısıroğlu, Geçmişi ve Geleceği ile Hilafet [İstanbul, 1993], 
138). This he cites as yet another ‘evidence’ that what Turkish 
secularists did by abolishing the caliphate was disrespectful to the 
principles of Islam, which makes sense only in the context of the 
discursive struggle among the contemporary writers.
43 A. Goldschmidt, Biographical Dictionary of Modern Egypt 
(Boulder, CO, 2000), 96–97.
44 Jawish, Hilafet-i İslamiye, 246–49.
45 I. Kara, “Giriş” in Hilafet Risaleleri, ed. I. Kara (Istanbul, 
2004), IV: 19.
46 Jawish, Hilafet-i İslamiye, 262.
the Quraysh condition. They probably thought that 
a Turkish caliph with no political power as a figure-
head for an otherwise secular government would be 
preferable to an Arab caliph with a claim for tempo-
ral as well as religious authority. Thus, for example, 
in the debate between pro-caliphate modernists and 
anti-caliphate secularists in Istanbul, only the ulema 
brought up the Quraysh question, but both groups 
supported the well-known Ottoman view—borrowed 
from Ibn Khaldun, al-Baqillani, ʿ Ayni, and al-Jurjani—
that what the Prophet had been referring to in the 
hadith was the Quraysh’s political power rather than 
its high status as an ethnic group. This interpretation 
was one of the few points on which the Islamist Hoca 
Şükrü and secularist Seyyid Bey agreed regarding the 
caliphate.47 However, Seyyid Bey was quick to add 
that the Ottoman caliphate was not a “true” caliphate, 
but a “fictitious” one, on other grounds. This was not 
because the Ottoman sultans were not the Prophet’s 
descendants, but because they were part of the ille-
gitimate “Sultanic period” that had started thirty years 
after the death of the Prophet, and which was clearly 
indicated by another prophetic hadith.48
Conclusion
In this specific debate on the ethnic origins of the 
Caliph, Arab nationalists (e.g., al-Kawakibi and Rashid 
Rida) based their criticism of the Ottoman caliphate 
on its illegitimate genealogical basis, as required by 
the Quraysh hadith. In response, pro-Ottoman ac-
tors employed two discursive strategies. First, they 
reinterpreted the Quraysh hadith, primarily based on 
the Khaldunian approach emphasizing the asabiyya of 
the caliph rather than his ethnic/tribal background. 
In this way, they denied the applicability of the hadith 
under current political circumstances, and used it to 
support the Ottoman cause instead. Secondly, they 
cited counter-hadiths that stressed the illegitimacy of 
making a claim for the caliphate when there already 
was a caliph, pointing to Qurʾanic verses that empha-
sized Muslim unity.
Invoking prophetic traditions on the preconditions 
for the caliphate was the primary discursive technique 
for both sides. The pro-Ottoman actors also frequently 
47 Şükrü, Hilafet-i İslamiye ve Büyük Millet Meclisi, 10–11; 
Seyyid Bey, Hilafet ve Hakimiyet-i Milliye, 12–13.
48 This hadith read, “The Caliphate will last thirty years, then 
will come the bitter Sultanate.” See A. Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, 4 vols. 
(Cairo, 1312–13), V: 220, 221.
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resorted to the famous “ul al-amr” verse (Qurʾan, 
5:59) that orders Muslims to obey God, the Prophet 
and “those vested with authority among [Muslims].” 
In their discursive struggle against the anti-caliphate 
movement, Ottoman supporters in Turkey, North 
Africa and India often relied on the Khaldunian in-
terpretation of the Quraysh hadith, whereas Arab na-
tionalists themselves mostly ignored Ibn Khaldun and 
emphasized the Quraysh condition instead.
In this political debate over the fate of the caliphate, 
then, Ibn Khaldun emerged as a central figure—a pri-
mary object of the pro-Ottoman discourse—and part 
of the discursive technique of invoking Islamic intel-
lectual tradition in defense of the Ottoman caliphate. 
The analysis of this specific debate between Ottoman 
supporters and Arab nationalists also indicates, there-
fore, that Ibn Khaldun’s views were not only widely 
circulated and discussed in the intellectual circles of 
the Ottoman Empire, but also played a role in the po-
litical struggles that shaped the modern Middle East 
in the early twentieth century.
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